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QUALIFYING THE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION AS A
FEDERAL ESTATE TAX MARITAL DEDUCTION
INTRODUCTION
One goal of effective estate planning is to keep the final estate
taxes as low as possible. Keeping assets out of the estate will ac-
complish this goal. On the other hand, exempting included assets
from estate tax computations reduces the base on which a tax is
computed. For a married couple, the marital deduction is a common
deduction from the gross estate of the first spouse to die.' Although
the most common source of assets for qualification under the marital
deduction is property bequeathed to a surviving spouse, the use of
statutory exemptions and allowances provided by various state
statutes furnishes a second source of qualification.
The statutory interest addressed in this note is the homestead
exemption. Where the marital deduction is available the homestead
exemption can be an effective tool for the removal of taxable assets
from the impact of the federal estate tax. Qualification of a state
homestead exemption does not follow automatically from its being a
statutory exemption. The benefits of the marital deduction are
restricted by the terminable interest rule which limits the reduction
of estate assets.2 It is the terminable interest rule that is the most
1. I.R.C. § 2056(a):
(a) Allowance of Marital Deduction. For purposes of the tax imposed
by section 2001, the value of the taxable estate shall, except as limited by
subsections (b) and (c), be determined by deducting from the value of the
gross estate an amount equal to the value of any interest in prop-
erty which passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving
spouse, but only to the extent that such interest is included in determin-
ing the value of the gross estate.
2. I.R.C. § 2056(b):
(b) Limitation in the Case of Life Estate or Other Terminable
Interest.
(1) General Rule. Where, on the lapse of time, on the occurrence
of an event or contingency, or on the failure of an event or contingency to
occur, an interest passing to the surviving spouse will terminate or fail,
no deduction shall be allowed under this section with respect to such in-
terest-
(A) if an interest in such property passes or has passed (for
less than an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth) from the decedent to any person other than
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severe limit on some state homestead exemptions. Interpretation of
the applicable state homestead exemption law and the correspond-
ing federal terminable interest statute thus becomes the key to
understanding the scope of qualifying homestead interests for the
marital deduction.
This note introduces the background of the homestead exemp-
tions and of the federal estate tax laws dealing with the marital
deduction and the terminable interest rule. Next, the combination of
federal and state law is analyzed from the view of Congress, the In-
ternal Revenue Service, and the courts to determine the reasons for
allowing or excluding the homestead interests in the few states
where these three bodies have discussed the marital deduction in
the homestead context. The objective of this analysis is a
methodology for determining the deductibility of specific state
homestead awards. In an appendix, the guidelines thus derived will
be applied to the various state statutes for those states that
recognize the homestead interest in a surviving spouse. Thus, the
reader can grasp the concepts of the homestead exemption from the
note and use the appendix to locate his state of interest. Initially, an
understanding of homestead law is needed in order to lay a founda-
tion for discussing the federal estate tax ramifications.
BACKGROUND OF HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIONS
Homestead may be defined as "a family residence owned, oc-
cupied, dedicated, limited, exempted, and restrained in alienability,"
as prescribed by statute.' The family residence normally constitutes
such surviving spouse (or the estate of such spouse); and
(B) if by reason of such passing such person (or his heirs or
assigns) may possess or enjoy any part of such property
after such termination or failure of the interest so passing to
the surviving spouse;
and no deduction shall be allowed with respect to such interest (even if
such deduction is not disallowed under subparagraphs (A) and (B))-
(C) if such interest is to be acquired for the surviving spouse;
pursuant to directions of the decedent, by his executor or by
the trustee of a trust.
3. R. WAPLES, A TREATISE ON HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTION 1 (1893). State
homestead exemption laws must be distinguished from federal homestead legislation
which encourages the settling of remote areas of the United States by granting the
settler an amount of land after a certain period of occupancy and cultivation. The only
exemption for these lands would be from debts contracted prior to the "homesteading"
of the land. However, the land would not be exempt from debts incurred subsequent to
gaining title. On the state level, the homestead laws affect land already owned and
debts after notice of the exemption protection. I& at 924-53.
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a dwelling house along with the land on which it is located.' The
quantitative and monetary limits on the homestead vary among the
states. However, unlike many laws which have a common law tradi-
tion, the homestead exemption arises from statutory or constitu-
tional provisions enacted by legislatures.'
Purpose of Homestead Exemptions
The legislative purpose underlying homestead statutes is to
protect the family by conservation of the "home." 6 Conservation of
the home is provided by excepting the homestead from those assets
available for the payment of the ordinary debts of the owner.7 The
homestead laws do not exonerate the debtor from his liabilities, but
rather give the creditor notice that the homestead property is
unavailable to satisfy these debts.' Therefore, the homestead exemp-
tion does not have an amnesty intent, even though there are
charitable characteristics. The intent of the homestead exemption
laws is to secure the permanency of the "home" and protect it from
forced sale.
Interest of the Surviving Spouse in the Homestead
Upon the death of the person owning the homestead, the prop-
erty is subject to the claims of creditors. However, the legislature
steps in where there is a surviving spouse and extends the
homestead interest of the decedent to the surviving spouse and
places the property within the protection of the statute." Thus, the
property received by the surviving spouse is not subject to
creditors' claims. The type of interest retained by the surviving
spouse is dependent upon the specific state law. These interests
range from the complete estate or interest that was vested in the
4. 2 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 577 (3d ed. 1939).
5. Id The assorted and contrasting homestead laws among the states may be
related to the statutory nature of the homestead laws. Common law was often carried
from state to state by the settlers. Statutory law, however, was created within the
state.
6. R. WAPPLES, A TREATISE ON HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTION 3 (1893).
7. Id. at8. ,
8. Id.
9. 2 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 577 (3d ed. 1939). In most
states the homestead exemption passes to the surviving spouse rather than being
renewed in the surviving spouse after the decedent's death. Along with the decedent's
exemption, some states allow the spouse to have a homestead in her own property.
Such homestead is separate from the interest received from the decedent.
1979]
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deceased homesteader" to an interest in the nature of a life estate."
Some states provide that certain subsequent conditions such as
remarriage" or failure to occupy 3 would terminate the interest.
Nevertheless, protection of the home is provided the surviving
spouse for as long as the conditions are met. The interest in the sur-
viving spouse is an important factor in determining qualification for
the marital deduction.
The Property Included in the Homestead
As with other aspects of the homestead statutes, the limita-
tions on the property awarded to a surviving spouse are dependent
upon the awarding state. In many states the interest is a strict
limitation defined by area." In contrast, many statutes provide a
homestead allowance of cash with no reference to, or in lieu of, the
underlying homestead property." Often the statutory limitation is a
combination of ap area limit of land and a limit in terms of value of
the property." Under a statute which provides a maximum limita-
10. Cal., CAL. PROB. CODE § 663 (West Supp. 1977); Nev., NEV. REV. STAT. §
146.050 (1977); S.D., S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 43-31-73 (Smith 1976); Utah, UTAH
UNIFORM PROB. CODE § 75-2-401 (1978); Wis., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 861.41 (West 1971).
11. Ala., Grisham v. Rothholz, 219 Ala. 434, 122 So. 649 (1929); Ark., ARK.
CONST. art. 9, § 6; Fla., FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 4; Ill., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 52, § 1 (Smith-
Hurd Cum. Supp. 1978); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 561.12 (West 1950); Ky., KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 427.070 (Baldwin 1978); Mass., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 188, § 4 (Michie/Law.
Co-op 1969); Mich., MICH. CONST. art. 10, § 3; Minn., MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 12; N.H., N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 480:3-a (1961); N.Y., N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 5206 (McKinney 1978); N.D.,
N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-16-02 (1976); S.C., S.C. CONST. art. 3, § 28; Tenn., TENN. CODE
ANN. § 31-104 (Cum. Supp. 1978); Tex., TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 52; Va., VA. CODE § 34-10
(1976).
12. Kan., KAN. STAT. § 59-402 (1976); Mass., MASS. ANN. STAT. ch. 188, § 4
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1969); N.C., N.C. CONST. art. X, § 2(3); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2329.75 (Baldwin 1975); Va., VA. CODE § 34-10 (1976).
13. Colo., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-41-203 (1973); Kan., KAN. STAT. § 59-401 (1976);
Miss., MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-1-19 (1972); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.75 (Baldwin
1975); Ore., ORE. REV. STAT. § 114.005 (1977); Vt., VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 101, 106 (1967);
Wyo., WYO. STAT. § 1-20-102 (1977).
14. Ark., ARK. CONST. art. 9, § 6; Kan., KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 9; Minn., MINN.
CONST. art. 1, § 12; S.D., S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 43-31-4 (Smith 1967).
15. Ariz., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-2401 (Cur. Supp. 1978-79); Colo., COLO. REV.
STAT. § 38-41-201 (Supp. 1976); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 560: 2-401 (1977); Idaho,
IDAHO CODE § 15-2-401 (Supp. 1975); Mich., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 709.62 (1968); Mo.,
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.290 (Vernon Supp. 1979); Mont., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
91A-2-401 (1977); Neb., NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2322 (1975); Wash., WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 11.52.010 (Supp. 1977).
16. Ala., ALA. CODE tit. 6, § 6-10-60 (1975); Ill., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 52, § 1
(Smith-Hurd Cum, Supp. 1978); Ky., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 427.070, .090 (Baldwin
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tion on the homestead exemption, whether it is in terms of area,
value or dollars, the possibility of the property exceeding these
limitations is continuous. If the limitation is an area or value limita-
tion, the statutory solution of partitioning of the land is needed to
meet the limitation. Without partitioning, sale of the property is the
only other alternative available to meet the homestead exemption
limitation.
Of particular difficulty is the situation where the property fails
to be partitioned and must be sold to satisfy the statute. With parti-
tioned land, the interest of the surviving spouse remains the same
before and after the partitioning; such interest is usually a life
estate. However, where the land is sold and the proceeds are awarded
in lieu of the homestead interest, a question arises as to whether the
interest in the cash proceeds is the same interest as that of the
prior homestead property. 7
Similarly, it is important to determine whether the interest in
the cash in lieu of the homestead interest came from the decedent
or whether the cash represents a payment for the sale of the
homestead interest owned by the surviving spouse. The difference
will determine whether the cash interest vested at the date of death
of the decedent or at a later date. By asserting that vesting occur-
1978); Mass., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 188, §§ 1, 4 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1969); N.H., N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 480: 1, 3-a (1968); N.Y., N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 5206 (McKinney
1978); N.C., N.C. CONST. art. X, § 2(3); N.D., N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30-16-02, 47-18-01
(1978); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2127.26 (Baldwin 1978); S.C., S.C. CODE §§ 34-1, -11
(1962); Tenn., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 31-104, 26-301 (Cum. Supp. 1978); Tex., TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 273 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978-79); Utah, UTAH UNIFORM PROB. CODE tit. 75,
§§ 75-2-401, -404 (1978); Vt., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 101 (1967); Va., VA. CODE §§ 34-4
(Cum. Supp. 1978), § 34-10 (1976); Wis., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 861.41 (West 1971); Wyo.,
WYO. STAT. § 1-20-104 (1977).
17. An interesting sidelight develops when the homestead property is sold
and the surviving spouse has a homestead interest in that property. The sale of the
homestead property presents problems of distribution of the proceeds. At the date of
death the spouse has an interest in the land up to the statutory limitation and the
heirs, devisees, or creditors have an interest in the excess over the limitation.
However, in most estate situations the property will not be sold on the date of death,
but at a later date. Often, appreciation of the value of the property occurs between the
date of death and the date of sale. The question is should the spouse benefit from the
appreciation in value? Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d 515 (1949). As an example, if the limit is
$10,000 and the date of death valuation is $20,000, does the spouse have a $10,000 in-
terest in the property or a 50% interest in the property? If the later sale produced
cash of $30,000 would the spouse receive $10,000 or $15,000 of the proceeds? Although
these problems are not within the scope of this note, they pose interesting questions
for the estate administrator. No doubt the state law would control and dictate the out-
come.
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red at the date of death, a spouse can comply with the rules of the
marital deduction since vesting from the decedent is one of the
criteria for determining if the interest passes or has passed from
the decedent."
The property constituting the homestead exemption plays a
significant role in the marital deduction analysis. If the statute
allows only an area of land for the exemption, then any cash received
for the interest in the land would not be considered eligible for the
marital deduction. However, if the statute allows more than an area
of land, then the term homestead property may include the land,
cash in lieu of the land, or some other property.
Summary of the Homestead Exemption
The homestead exemption offers the surviving spouse the same
protection from creditors which the decedent enjoyed. Often the ex-
emption is conditional depending on life, occupancy, or remarriage.
The primary objective of a study of the homestead law of a par-
ticular state is to determine what property is received by the sur-
viving spouse and what her interest is in that property. The
ultimate goal of qualification as a martial deduction for estate tax
purposes depends on the transmitted interest in the property from
the decedent to the surviving spouse. Essentially, the state statute
controls the marital deduction for federal estate tax purposes.
FEDERAL ESTAf TAX
An estate tax is one levied on the privilege of transmitting prop-
erty at death. 19 Its purpose is not to raise revenues or stabilize the
economy as is the case with other taxes, but rather, the purpose of
an estate tax is the equalization of wealth."0 Federal estate taxes
meet the equalization objective with the general policy that wealth
will not be transmitted tax-free at death." The initial inquiry is
whether a homestead interest passed from a decedent to a surviving
spouse is part of the wealth that should be subject to the estate
transfer tax. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (Code), section
18. I.R.C. § 2056.
19. B. BITTKER & L. STONE. FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION
990 (4th ed. 1972). While the estate tax is a transmission tax, it is a tax on the
transmitting of property by the decedent to a recipient. The opposite occurs with an
inheritance tax which burdens the recipient with a tax on property inherited.
20. i& at 983.
21. United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118, 131 (1963).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 [1979], Art. 5
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2033, defines the property to be included in the gross estate of the
decedent as "the value of all property to the extent of the interest
therein of the decedent at the time of his death." The Treasury
Regulations clarify the Code section with the statement that "Prop-
erty subject to homestead or other exemptions under local law is in-
cluded in the gross estate."' Therefore, the Code looks to the in-
terest in the decedent at death to determine inclusion of a
homestead interest rather than to whom the homestead will pass or
what interest will be received by the donee.
Once the homestead interest is included in the decedent's
estate, the next step in preparing an estate tax return is to deter-
mine if the included interest can be deducted from the value of the
estate. For a homestead interest passing to a surviving spouse, the
appropriate deduction would be the marital deduction."
Marital Deduction
Code section 2056(a) provides:
For purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001, the
value of the taxable estate shall, [subject to limitations],
be determined by deducting from the value of the gross
estate an amount equal to the value of any interest in prop-
erty which passes or has passed from the decedent to his
surviving spouse, but only to the extent that such interest
is included in determining the value of the gross estate. 2
Although the wording of the statute has the appearance of being
generous by giving special treatment to a surviving spouse, in fact,
the intention of section 2056 is not charitable. The marital deduction
provision was enacted to solve a critical conflict between states that
have community property laws and those with common laws. 25 The
effect of this conflict had been that estates in common law states
carried a greater tax burden than estates of community property
states. The greater tax burden arose because when a decedent died
in a community property state, one-half of the community property
was treated as belonging to the decedent and one-half as belonging
to the surviving spouse. Therefore, because the federal estate tax
22. Treas. Reg. § 20.2033-1(b), T.D. 6684, 28 Fed. Reg. 11,409 (1963).
23. I.R.C. § 2056.
24. I.R.C. § 2056(a).
25. S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1163 (1948).
1979]
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laws followed the state laws, only one-half of community property
was included in the gross estate of the decedent."6 On the other
hand, a decedent from a common law state was required to include
the entire amount of his property in his gross estate, even though
the property may have been the joint product of a marriage."
To remedy this disparity Congress acted in 1948 to change sec-
tion 2056. Congress could not repeal the 1942 law without further
action because the original inequities would exist where the com-
munity property estates did not bear their share of the tax burden. 8
The 1948 Revenue Act repealed the 1942 statute with the effect of
putting the property laws back into the hands of the state rather
than in the Federal Code. Additionally, the approach taken was to
give the common law state estates the same estate-splitting advan-
tage enjoyed by the community property states.' Therefore,
although section 2056(a) allows a deduction from the gross estate for
interests in property which pass to a surviving spouse, section
2056(c)(1)(A)(ii) limits the deduction to one-half of the value of the ad-
justed gross estate.2 0
26. S. REP. No. 1013, 80th cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1167 (1948).
27. Id
28. In 1942 Congress attempted to solve the conflict by denying recognition of
the community property state laws. B. BITTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE
AND GIFT TAXATION 1101 (4th ed. 1972). Thus, the entire community property was in-
cluded in the gross estate unless the decedent's representative could show separate in-
terests in the surviving spouse. However, the nonrecognition of the state law did not
equalize the conflict as legislators thought it would. For example, an estate could be
subject to a tax liability in excess of the assets available to pay the tax since federal
law required inclusion of the total community property in the estate, when at the same
time the community property state law gave an interest in only one-half of those in-
cluded assets from which to pay the tax. S. REP. No. 1013, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1188-89 (1948). The possibility of a tax
greater than the assets available to pay the tax developed because of the progressive
nature of the federal estate tax rates. As shown in I.R.C. § 2001, the maximum
marginal tax rate on an adjusted gross estate is 70%. Therefore, on an estate of
$10,000,000 the tentative estate tax computes to $6,050,800. Yet a community property
law would give the estate assets of $5,000,000 (1/2 of $10,000,000) from which to pay the
tax. If the community property was the only asset of the estate, there could possibly
be a deficiency of $1,050,800 in estate tax from the insolvable situation created by the
1942 amendment. The inequality preceding the amendment was reversed by the 1942
statute to a position where the advantage was to the estate of a decedent in a common
law state.
29. 4 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION
5339 (1977).
30. I.R.C. § 2056(c)(1)(A)(ii). The complete limitation on aggregate of deduc-
tions is:
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 [1979], Art. 5
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The end result desired by Congress, to equalize estate taxes
regardless of the state of residence, was effectively implemented by
the marital deduction provisions. Yet, the marital deduction section
as written allowed a broad range of interests, such as life estates, to
become sheltered from estate tax. Because the deduction of such in-
terests was beyond the equalization purpose of the marital deduc-
tion, Congress created the terminable interest rule to place a limit
on the marital deduction.
Terminable Interest Rule
Even with the deduction limited to one-half the adjusted gross
estate, a homestead interest would qualify as an interest passing
from the decedent but for an additional limitation on the marital
deduction. This additional limitation is the terminable interest rule
found in section 2056(b). 1 Generally, the marital deduction excepts
property from the decedent's estate because the property will be
taxed at the death of the surviving spouse if not consumed prior to
death. 2 The terminable interest rule was written to insure that prop-
erty would be taxed in at least one of the spouse's estates.3
(1) Limitation.
(A) In General. The aggregate amount of the deductions allowed
under this section (computed without regard to this subsection) shall not
exceed the greater of-
(i) $250,000, or
(ii) 50 percent of the value of the adjusted gross estate.
31. Note that the Regulations distinguish between property and an interest in
property. The terminable interest rule applies to an interest in property passing at
death. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-1(e)(2) (1958). The words "interest" and "property" as
used have entirely separate meanings. The word "property" includes all objects or
rights which are subject to ownership. The word "interest" indicates the extent of the
ownership. "Interest" expresses the quality or amount of ownership in a particular
piece of property. Thus, if a spouse has a life estate in a farm, the "property" is the
farm, and the "interest" in the farm is the life estate. 2 J. LASSER, ESTATE TAX
TECHNIQUE 1430 (1966).
32. Baker, The Marital Deduction and the Terminable Interest Rule, 40 TENN.
L. REV. 195, 196 (1973).
33. In Estate of Pipe v. Comm'r, 23 T.C. 99 (1954), affd, 241 F.2d 210 (2d Cir.),
cert denied, 355 U.S. 814 (1957), the court presents an excellent summary of the ter-
minable interest rule:
Generally speaking, the terminable interest concept was devised
for the purpose of assuming that if the property bequeathed to the spouse
was to be excluded from the gross estate with respect to the decedent, it
would be adequately integrated in the spouse's estate so that on her
death it would not escape the death tax a second time .... The basic prin-
ciple ... is that the spouse first to die shall be permitted to pass onto the
19791
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The underlying theory is that, unless consumed, either gift or
estate taxes will tax the property during the same generation which
would be in either the decedent's estate or the estate of the surviv-
ing spouse. 4 But if the interest is not vested in the surviving spouse
such that she does not have control or another person has been
given an interest in the property, then the rule calls such an in-
terest terminable and excludes it from the marital deduction. 5 The
specific provisions of the terminable interest limitation are:
Where, on the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an
event or contingency, or on the failure of an event or con-
tingency to occur, an interest passing to the surviving
spouse will terminate or fail, no deduction shall be allowed
under this section with respect to such interest-
(A) if an interest in such property passes or has passed
(for less than an adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth) from the decedent to any person other
than such surviving spouse; and
(B) if by reason of such passing such person (or his
heirs or assigns) may possess or enjoy any part of such
property after such termination or failure of the interest
so passing to the surviving spouse; .... 31
Some examples of terminable interests controlled by the occur-
rence or non-occurrence of an event are life estates, leases, joint
tenancies, or estates for years." As terminable interests they are
excluded from the marital deduction. Even if a terminable interest
is "whole," but fails because of its nature, it will not qualify for the
marital deduction. "Whole" means the interest will not terminate
by the occurrence or non-occurrence of an event; rather, it ter-
minates for some other reason. Patents are examples of interests
that are "whole" yet are terminable interests which do not qualify
for the marital deduction.38
surviving spouse free of estate tax up to one-half of his or her estate, pro-
vided only that the terms of the transfer are such that this property will
be taxable in the estate of the surviving spouse. Id at 104.
34. 4 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION
5357 (1977).
35. Baker, The Marital Deduction and the Terminable Interest Rule, 40 TENN.
L. REV. 195, 196 (1973).
36. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(1).
37. 2 J. LASSER, ESTATE TAX TECHNIQUES 1431 (1966).
38. Id.
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Although section 2056(b)(1) excludes most terminable interests,
there are some that can qualify for the marital deduction. If the only
interest a decedent has in the property is a terminable interest and
the entire interest is given to the spouse, the deduction is permit-
ted. 9 Conversely, an interest which is terminable at the decedent's
death which later becomes non-terminable is not provided for by the
Code and, therefore, such an interest may be taxable in the dece-
dent's estate and in the surviving spouse's estate upon death."0 This
distinction is critical where the homestead interest in the land is a
life estate, but the interest in cash received from the sale of the
land is an absolute interest. If the interest was terminable and
becomes non-terminable at a later date, the terminable interest rule
still disqualifies such an interest from the marital deduction. Thus,
terminability for the terminable interest rule is determined as of the
time of death of the decedent."
The marital deduction and terminable interest rule are specific
in controlling the exclusion of estate assets from taxation. For the
homestead exemption, the qualification of a marital deduction hinges
on the determination of whether an interest is terminable or non-
terminable. Consequently, the wording of the state homestead
statutes is critical to this distinction. For the marital deduction re-
quirements, the hurdle is to show that the homestead passed from
the decedent to the surviving spouse. In many cases "passing from
the decedent" will not be enough to obtain the deduction. The ter-
minable interest rule may stand in the way of an interest such as a
life estate which may satisfy "passing," but which is disqualified as
being "terminable." Only when the words of the statute satisfy the
39. S. REP. No. 1013, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 2 U.S. CODE CONG.
AD. NEWS 1190 (1948).
40. Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503, 509-10 (1964). Under California law
a widow is provided an allowance for support during the settlement of the decedent's
estate. The assets from which the allowance is drawn are estate assets and are included
in the decedent's estate for tax purposes. The Supreme Court of the United States
held these payments as terminable at the decedent's death since a subsequent death of
the widow would terminate the allowance payments. The widow argued that the
payments actually received were not terminable under California law. In response, the
distinction relied upon by the Court centered on the fact that such payments were ter-
minable interests at the death of the decedent which later became non-terminable in-
terests upon receipt by the widow. Therefore, since such interests are determined as
of the date of death, the interests are terminable interests for computing the marital
deduction. The Jackson decision thus leaves open the possibility of transfers between
the decedent and the spouse being taxed in the decedent's estate and in the widow's
estate.
41. Id. at 508.
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marital deduction and terminable interest requirements will the
estate tax be reduced. Not only do homestead statutes require
analysis, but often the underlying state court decisions play an im-
portant part in the qualification or exclusion of a homestead interest
as a marital deduction.
Influence of State Law on Section 2056
When analyzing a state homestead statute to determine the in-
terest of a surviving spouse it is crucial to determine if the state
court's interpretation of the statute will be binding on the deter-
mination of federal estate tax liabilities. This is especially important
since the state statute is the basis for applying the federal law. In
the landmark case, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins," the Supreme
Court of the United States decided that a federal court in a diversity
case may apply its own rules of procedure, but must apply the
substantive law of the state in which it sits. Erie addressed the
issue where the applicable law in the case was state law. In federal
estate tax cases the law being applied is primarily federal and not
state law, although state law plays a part in determining the in-
terest which passes.
The influence state court decisions should have on federal tax
law was determined in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Estate
of Bosch.43 Bosch drew from Erie the argument that the states
should decide their own laws, but went further to state that if the
United States was not a party to the state proceedings, the court's
interpretation of a statute would be binding only if rendered by the
highest court of the state." In other words, the states are best
suited to determine state law, but until the highest court has
spoken, a final determination has not been reached. Therefore, a
federal court deciding an estate tax question may sit as if it were a
state court in determining the underlying interest based on state
law. 41
The Bosch decision stands in the background in the following
analysis of the various state homestead statutes. If the highest court
of the particular state has rendered a decision concerning the in-
terest that has passed from the decedent, then that decision will be
binding when considering the marital deduction or terminable in-
42. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
43. 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
44. Id at 465.
45. Id
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terest rule. However, if only a lower state court has ruled, the
estate should be concerned that even though the decision may
preliminarily be in its favor, a later and final determination may be
made to the contrary. A federal court could reverse the ruling of the
state court when the federal court applies the state law to a
homestead interest. Such a determination could eliminate a marital
deduction which the estate thought allowable under the state court
decision.
Summary of the Federal Estate Tax
An estate tax will be levied on any property included in the
decedent's estate unless some means can be used to reduce the
estate. Initially, the homestead interest is a property interest included
in the estate. Foremost among the means for excluding the
homestead interest, where it passes to a surviving spouse, is the
marital deduction. Recognition of the terminable interest rule,
however, is needed to effectuate the exclusion of a homestead in-
terest. Bridging the gap between the marital deduction and the
homestead interest is the specific state statute. Interpretation of
this statute is the key to the ultimate goal of reducing the estate tax.
Consequently, the estate must consider the sources of
statutory interpretation. Bosch indicates that the highest state court
is the best authority on state law."6 Absent such a decision, the
federal court may fill the role of a state court in the interpretation
of the state statute. In short, the marital deduction can be used as a
tool to qualify a homestead interest as an exclusion which would
reduce the estate tax. The terminable interest rule, however, may
be a weapon against the estate. If the terminable interest rule
operates, three events will occur: the estate tax of the decedent will
be denied a reduction in amount, the non-excluded assets will be in-
cluded in the decedent's estate, and the same assets will be included
in the surviving spouse's estate. The tremendous impact of such a
possibility requires the estate planner to closely analyze the inter-
relationships between the federal law, represented by the marital
deduction and terminable interest rule, and the state homestead ex-
emption statute.
FEDERAL ESTATE TAXES AND THE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
The homestead exemption has received little direct interpreta-
tion in the context of federal estate taxes and the marital deduction.
46. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
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On the other hand, the broader category, statutory interests, of
which the homestead exemption is a part, has received much atten-
tion. On the federal level many of the arguments for exempting
other statutory interests will apply equally to the homestead in-
terest. Some of the other statutory interests from which these
arguments may be drawn are dower, curtesy, widow's allowance,
and family allowance.
The analysis of the relationships between the homestead ex-
emption and the marital deduction requires division of the
homestead exemption into two parts. This division is needed
because of the distinctions made in many statutes. The first part is
the property award. When the state homestead statute produces an
interest in the actual homestead property for the surviving spouse,
the statute is awarding the homestead property to the spouse. In
contrast, the second part of the exemption statute often provides an
award in lieu of the homestead property. This award is often in the
form of cash. 7 The cash award has many of the characteristics of the
property award, such as vesting. Its difficulties stem from the fact
that cash is often treated as a substitute for the property award
rather than as an equal alternative.
Moreover, the adversary position taken by the Internal
Revenue Service in many disputes over the homestead interest as a
marital deduction assumes the cash award represents proceeds from
the sale of the interest in the property. Contrary to this assumption,
the interest of the property award of homestead and the cash award
are separate and distinct interests of a surviving spouse and should
be treated as such in those jurisdictions allowing both interests.
The guidelines developed for the property award and for the
cash award are used on each of the separate state homestead laws
in an appendix to determine whether an estate in such a state could
possibly exclude the interest as a marital deduction. In the applica-
tion to state laws, the first determination to be made must be to
47. The most common award in lieu of homestead is a cash award. However,
the award could be of property of the estate other than the homestead property such
as a diamond ring or securities. The proper terminology for the award is the "award in
lieu of homestead" interest. However, since the interrelationships of the award of
homestead and award in lieu of homestead are independently complex, they would be
further confused by using such similar labels as "award of homestead" and "award in
lieu of homestead" for two distinct interests. To help clarify the confusion for the pur-
poses of this note the term "cash award" will be substituted for "award in lieu of
homestead" and the term "property award" will be substituted for "award of
homestead."
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 [1979], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol13/iss2/5
HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
establish if the state provides a homestead exemption. If it does, the
next step is to examine the statute to see if these are separable in-
terests of an award of property and cash. Then the interests will be
examined for marital deduction qualifications. Since the property
award and the cash award are substantially different interests, each
is treated separately in determining the guidelines for analyzing a
state homestead statute.
A. Property Award
The separate interest of the property award derived from a
homestead exemption statute extends the exemption to an interest
in the homestead property. At the decedent's death the surviving
spouse has an interest in her husband's exempted property. To
satisfy this interest, a statute awarding the homestead property will
provide the spouse with an estate in the same homestead property
in which the decedent had an interest. Since the marital deduction
requires the interest to be passed from the decedent, the property
award must also pass or vest from the decedent to qualify. As with
any interest qualifying as a marital deduction, the property award
must meet the terminable interest rule provisions. Within the ter-
minable interest rule the homestead interest must not only avoid
terminability in terms of the life of the surviving spouse, but must
also escape other conditional rights of a spouse such as occupancy or
remarriage. Qualification for the property award requires a combina-
tion of avoidance of the terminable interest rule and retention of the
vesting from the decedent.
Vesting in the Surviving Spouse
To qualify for the marital deduction the homestead property
must have been included in the adjusted gross estate of the dece-
dent. 8 Along with the compulsory inclusion of the property award
by the Treasury Regulations,"' the Code requires a vested and in-
defeasible interest in the property by the surviving spouse. 0
Without such a vested interest the property award would be deem-
ed to come from the estate rather than from the decedent, a result
that would not satisfy the Code's vesting requirement. This does not
mean the property cannot be distributed by the estate; rather, it
48. I.R.C. § 2056(a).
49. I.R.C. § 2033; Treas. Reg. § 20.2033-1(b), T.D. 6684, 28 Fed. Reg. 11,409
(1963).
50. Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503, 509 (1964). See note 40 supra.
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means the spouse must have had a vested interest in the property
at the decedent's death."
For example, in California a statutory award called the family
allowance is a right of a surviving spouse." However, the spouse
does not receive the right until it is granted by a court order.53
Therefore, the court has two functions regarding the family
allowance in California: (1) to grant the right to the spouse; and (2) to
determine the amount or value of that right. The Supreme Court of
the United States in Jackson v. United States pointed out that since
the court has to grant the right, nothing accrues to the spouse prior
to the grant." The result is that the right is not vested at the death
of the decedent and so is not available for the marital deduction.15 If
the surviving spouse had died prior to obtaining a court order,
nothing would have been payable to her estate, thus supporting the
decision that the right did not vest at his death." The function of
the California family allowance statute is to give the spouse the
right to apply to the court for the allowance and to give the court
the power to grant the allowance to the spouse.
Jackson turned on the determination of when the interest
vested and not when the interest was valued. Vesting occurred upon
the granting of a court order. Similarly, the homestead interest
must vest at the decedent's death in order to qualify for the marital
deduction. The Jackson family allowance vested in the spouse a
right to apply for the allowance although such application could not
physically occur until after the decedent's death. The post-mortem
claim of a spouse would appear to be a condition of receiving any
statutory interest and, being conditional, the claim would seem to be
a terminable interest. If this logic were followed almost all statutory
interests in a surviving spouse would fail as marital deductions
because of terminability.
51. Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503, 509 (1964).
52. CAL. PROB. CODE § 680 (West Supp. 1978).
53. The California Probate Code's specific language indicates a court-granted
right when section 680 states "in the discretion of the court or judge granting it." The
only right a surviving spouse has at the decedent's death is the right to apply for an
allowance, but the right to the allowance distribution does not accrue until after a
court order grants it. Cunha's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 279 F.2d
292, 297 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 942, rehearing denied, 368 U.S. 870
(1961).
54. 376 U.S. 503, 506 (1964).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 507.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 [1979], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol13/iss2/5
HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
The administrative filing dilemma for statutory interests was
resolved in a dower situation. In response to a dower claim, the
court in Hawaiian Trust Company v. United States5 7 stated that
when a state provides a statutory right for a surviving spouse, the
formal procedural requirement of claiming such a right, although
post-mortem, does not make the right conditional so as to be ter-
minable. In distinguishing Jackson, the court noted that the Califor-
nia family allowance was not a vested right at death, whereas the
dower right in Hawaiian Trust had vested at death.58 The procedural
filing requirement in Jackson was moot since the right itself lacked
the prerequisite vesting. The filing of a claim in Hawaiian Trust was
for the purpose of admeasurement of the dower interest rather than
to establish the vesting of the interest. 9 To satisfy the Jackson and
Hawaiian Trust holdings for statutory interests, a property award
must be vested in the stirviving spouse at the date of the decedent's
death although the claim and admeasurement could be subsequent
to the death.
Terminability
A homestead statute awarding a terminable interest to a
spouse will keep the estate from taking a marital deduction for the
interest. Florida's strictly quantitative" homestead statute il-
lustrates a terminable interest in the form of a life estate:
[If the decedent is survived by a spouse and lineal descen-
dants, the surviving spouse shall take a life estate in the
homestead, with a vested remainder to the lineal descen-
dants in being at the time of the decedent's death."'
Since Florida provides a life estate in the surviving spouse, the in-
terest is terminable and would defeat the attempt to claim a marital
deduction for the interest.
A statute such as Florida's clearly is terminable and not sub-
ject to the marital deduction of Code section 2056. The marital
deduction would be available only if the decedent also had a ter-
57. 412 F.2d 1313, 1314 (U.S. Ct. of Cl. 1969).
58. Id
59. Id.
60. FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 4, describes the homestead quantitatively as 160
acres if located outside a municipality and one-half acre if in a municipality. The award
does not allow for commutation of the homestead interest which would complicate the
illustration.
61. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.401 (West 1976).
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minable interest in the homestead property such as a lease or life
estate. 2 If the decedent had a lease, it would be subject to a
homestead exemption by him and also by the surviving spouse."3
However, because Code section 2056(b)(1) classifies a lease as a ter-
minable interest no marital deduction is allowed. A life estate in the
decedent terminates at his death even though he could have had
homestead protection during his life." If the surviving spouse ob-
tained a life estate in the same property it would not affect the
estate taxes because such property would not be included in the
gross estate. 5 Also, if the decedent owned a life estate the marital
deduction would not be allowed because the spouse's homestead in-
terest would come from a previous grantor rather than from the
decedent. The spouse may have a vested interest in the form of a re-
mainder, but it would vest from the previous grantor, not from the
decedent.
The typical conditional homestead statute makes survival the
condition on which the interest is awarded. Survival, as a condition,
gives rise to a life estate in the property which would clearly be a
terminable interest."' In applying the terminable interest rule,
however, survival is not the only condition that would render an in-
terest terminable. For example, in Illinois the homestead interest is
made conditional upon the continued occupancy of the homestead
property by the surviving spouse. Consequently, if the spouse
would lose the exemption by abandoning the homestead the exempt-
ed property would be subject to a terminable interest. Along with
occupancy or remarriage is another terminable condition which will
cut short the homestead protection. Another condition is a term of
years whereby the protection is afforded the spouse for a statutory
period at the lapse of which time the property reverts according to
the law as if the homestead exemption had not been applied. In
short, any condition attached to the property award prevents a
marital deduction by creating a terminable feature in the homestead
award.
62. S. REP. No. 1013, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1190 (1948).
63. R. WAPLES, A TREATISE ON HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTION 113 (1893).
64. Id at 116.
65. I.R.C. § 2033. The only life estate that would be included in the gross
estate would be property that was transferred by the decedent during his life, where
he retained a life estate in such property. I.R.C. § 2036.
66. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(1); 2 J. LASSER, ESTATE TAX TECHNIQUES 1431 (1966).
67. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 52, § 2 (Smith-Hurd 1967). "Such [homestead] exemp-
tion shall continue after the death of such householder, for the benefit of the husband
or wife surviving, so long as he or she continues to occupy such homestead .... " Id.
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Whether or not the condition actually occurs is irrelevant to
the terminable interest rule. As pointed out in Hamilton National
Bank of Knoxville v. United States,68 the critical factor in applying
the terminable interest rule is the possibility of the failure of the in-
terest rather than the actual failure. For example, if a state's
homestead statute employs remarriage as a condition, the spouse
may live her remaining life in widowhood and never break the
remarriage condition. But preserving the remarriage condition will
not save the marital deduction because the Code judges the condi-
tion from the date of death of the decedent and does not look at
future events or the lack of future events. Accordingly, the Code
sees remarriage as a possibility and thus as a terminable condition
that removes the potential of a marital deduction. Therefore, a
statute must provide an absolute, unconditional interest in the sur-
viving spouse or the marital deduction will not be allowed.
Summary of the Property Award
The property award, being an award of an interest in the
homestead property, qualifies for the marital deduction if it vests
from the decedent and is not a terminable interest. Vesting requires
the property award to pass from the decedent rather than from
some other source such as a court order granting an interest to the
surviving spouse. The vesting will not be defeated by a formal, pro-
cedural statutory requirement of claiming the property award as
long as the award vested at the time of death. A procedural filing
will relate back to the decedent's date of death and satisfy the
vesting requirement.
Moreover, terminability is an important but negative aspect of
qualifying the property award for the marital deduction. An interest
which is terminable will bar a marital deduction. Terminability is
based on conditional features such as life estates, continual occupan-
cy, remarriage, or a term of years in the homestead interest. Quali-
fying a property award incorporates vesting at death followed by an
absolute, unconditional interest in the surviving spouse.
B. Cash Award in Lieu of the Homestead Interest
Like the homestead award, an amount of property or cash
given in lieu of the homestead interest will be included in the gross
estate of the decedent. 9 However, commutation of the homestead in-
68. 353 F.2d 930, 931-32 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 939 (1966).
69. I.R.C. § 2056(a).
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terest creates more problems than the simple award of the
homestead property. The typical homestead statute will limit the
amount or value of the homestead interest. For example, the Wyom-
ing homestead statute provides as follows:
When any person dies seized of a homestead leaving
as survivor a widow [or] husband, ... the survivor is entitled
to the homestead . . .70
The homestead may consist of a house and lot or lots, in
any town or city or of a farm consisting of any number of
acres ... the value of which does not exceed six thousand
dollars ($6,000.00)."
The Wyoming statute illustrates the problem created by a cash
award in lieu of the homestead interest. If a Wyoming homestead is
valued at an amount greater than six thousand dollars, the interest
is limited. A problem arises as to the interest remaining in the sur-
viving spouse. One alternative solution could be partitioning the prop-
erty and giving a parcel within the limitations to the spouse. In such
a case the spouse would retain the same interest as in the
homestead property whether it is absolute or conditional. Wyoming
provides that if the value exceeds the limitation, the property can
be sold with the proceeds up to the six thousand dollar limit going
to the spouse."2 However, in Wyoming the homestead interest in the
property operates only so long as there is continued occupancy of
the property by the spouse." Such an interest in the property would
be a terminable interest not subject to the marital deduction.74
Following a sale of the homestead property which has a value ex-
ceeding six thousand dollars, the spouse now holds cash-in-hand
rather than property in return for her interest. Applying the oc-
cupancy statute to the "cash" would be meaningless. This
demonstrates that the questions to be answered in analyzing the
cash awards are more complex than the qualification of the award of
the homestead property.
In addition to the problems common to the property award of
vesting and terminability, other problems unique to the cash award
must be overcome to insure qualifications as a marital deduction.
70. WYo. STAT. § 1-20-103 (1977).
71. WYO. STAT. § 1-20-104 (1977).
72. WYO. STAT. §§ 1-20-101, -107 (1977).
73. WYo. STAT. § 1-20-102 (1977).
74. I.R.C. § 2056(b).
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The examination is not entirely separate and distinct from a discus-
sion of the property award since the problems originate to some ex-
tent from the relationship between the property award and the cash
award. Finding an equality of interests in the property award and
the cash award would allow the surviving spouse to use the chose in
action concept, thereby giving her a vested right at the decedent's
death. Thus, the award of the homestead property or an award of
cash represents her choice of the alternative means of satisfying her
vested interest. On the other hand, if the homestead statute in-
dicates dominance of the property award in the relationship such
that the cash award is actually proceeds from the sale of her property
award, then a marital deduction would bedisallowed since it did not
vest from the decedent.
While considering the relationship of the property award and
the cash award, the terminable interest rule lurks in the background
to deny the surviving spouse an otherwise vested marital deduction.
The conditional nature of the cash award must also be considered.
While the typical conditions for the property award were occupancy
or widowhood, the conditions of a statute for the cash award are
often reinvestment in another homestead, investment in securities
or some other holding device so that the spouse derives the benefits
from the proceeds yet the cash reverts to the proper heirs if the
condition is met.
Beyond the conditional restrictions, the cash award must also
be of a mandatory nature rather than payable at the court's discre-
tion. Similarly, the homestead statute, and not an agreement be-
tween the spouse and the estate administrator, must be the source of
the cash award. A discretionary award will bring about terminabili-
ty, and as a result of the terminability problem and the relationship
between the property award and the cash award, the cash award re-
quires more scrutiny to qualify it for the marital deduction.
Chose in Action
The concept of "chose" constitutes a broader meaning of the
term property and includes all rights which are of value."5 Normally,
a right is thought of as a right to tangible property. In the larger
definition of property a "right" consists of claims by the owner
against a third party."6 Since these rights can be enforced by action
75. R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 11 (3d ed. 1975).
76. Id.
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and the rights have value, they are property to the owner." Choses
can be divided into two categories; "choses in possession" and
"choses in action." Applying the concept of "chose" to homestead
laws, a "chose in possession" would be a right of the surviving
spouse to the award of the actual homestead property. On the other
hand a "chose in action" would imply that the spouse had a right to
take action with respect to the homestead interest. This right has
value and comes from the decedent. Upon claiming this right, the
spouse could elect to have the right assigned. However, the value
could be assigned in the form of possession of the property or in the
form of a cash award in lieu of the homestead interest. With this
interpretation of a homestead statute, the form of the assigned prop-
erty, possession or cash, is irrelevant to the determination of
vesting from the decedent. Assignment is only relevant to the prop-
erty received; thus, in many statutes possession is a life interest,
whereas cash is an absolute or unconditional interest.
The significance of applying a chose in action theory to
homestead exemption laws is that the receipt of a cash award by the
spouse for her homestead interest would not be considered a sale of
her non-deductible life interest. Rather, the cash award would repre-
sent an assignment of the right (chose in action) received from the
decedent. Since the interest in the cash award would normally be
absolute, the chose in action would be absolute. Thus, cash from the
commutation of the homestead interest would be qualified for the
marital deduction as a non-terminable interest passing from the
decedent.
United States v. Traders National Bank of Kansas City"8 ap-
plied the chose in action theory to homestead exemption law. In
Traders the estate attempted to deduct the commuted value of the
homestead interest as a marital deduction on the federal estate tax
return." Upon audit, the deduction was disallowed by the Commis-
sioner." The estate then paid the tax deficiency and filed a claim for
refund based on the argument that the commuted value of the
homestead right was a valid and legitimate marital deduction from
the decedent's gross estate. 1 The pertinent portion of the Missouri
homestead statute applied in Traders stated that the "widow shall
77. Id
78. 148 F. Supp. 278 (W.D. Mo. 1956), affd. 248 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1957).
79. 1& at 280.
80. Id
81. Id.
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have the right to occupy such homestead during her life or
widowhood, and upon her remarriage or death it shall pass to the
heirs of the husband."82 On the surface this statute appears to give
the surviving spouse a terminable interest which the Commissioner
might rightly reject as a marital deduction due to the conditions of
widowhood and survival. However, the court searched deeper into
Missouri law to establish the interest in the spouse upon commuta-
tion of the homestead interest.
A separate Missouri statute provides an option for the surviv-
ing spouse. When a life estate is owned the spouse can retain the
life interest or elect to receive cash in lieu of the life interest.3 The
court held that if the widow elected to receive the commuted value
the homestead property would be free from the statutory ter-
minable interest restrictions.8 Thus, there is a statutory option in
Missouri for the widow and the life estate provision relates only to
the alternative of possession of the homestead property.85 Therefore,
at the option of the surviving spouse, the election to receive cash
renders the interest absolute. Assignment of the homestead interest
in the form of cash is non-determinative in establishing the absolute
right of the spouse; it only determines the interest in the cash
received.
The chose in action approach to homestead statutes may be the
most effective means of qualifying a cash sum as a marital deduc-
tion. As in Traders, the scope of the analysis of the state statutes
should encompass more than an examination of the specific
homestead statutes; it should also entail a search of all related
statutes to determine the interest acquired.
Terminable Interest
As with the award of the homestead property, the cash award
would be excluded from the marital deduction if deemed a ter-
82. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.495 (Vernon 1952). Although the Traders case is the
primary court decision used in adopting the chose in action theory for homestead ex-
emptions, it is no longer applicable in Missouri. The law under which Traders was
decided was repealed and replaced by a cash award statute. By statute the cash award
may consist of money, or real or personal property and vests absolutely in the spouse.
Under the new law, as with the repealed law, an award of cash from the decedent
would vest absolutely in the surviving spouse and would qualify such an amount as a
marital deduction. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.290 (Vernon Supp. 1979).
83. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 442.530 (Vernon 1952).
84. United States v. Traders National Bank of Kansas City, 148 F. Supp. at
85. Id.
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minable interest."' Terminability could be established if the cash
represented the proceeds from the sale of a terminable homestead
interest, such as a life estate. If the cash is an assignment of a chose
in action, then the assignment could be terminable even though it
vested from the decedent. The Michigan homestead statute provides
for options depending on the value of the homestead property.87
However, even if the cash option is elected the proceeds must be
reinvested in either the purchase of a new homestead or securities
for the benefit of the spouse.8 The new homestead or securities take
on the same homestead exemption qualities as the original
homestead which is a life estate. Therefore, the circuitous Michigan
statute allows a cash award, but the cash has a terminable restraint.
Homestead statute anaylsis requires an absolute or terminable
determination even if the assignment of the interest is in the form
of cash. A terminable interest determination denies the spouse a
marital deduction when cash is received.
Sale of a Life Interest in the Homestead Property
Where the interest in the homestead property is a terminable
interest such as a life estate, cash proceeds given to the spouse may
86. I.R.C. § 2056(b).
87. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 709.62 (1968).
Same sale or divison Sec. 62. Upon the confirmation of the report, the pro-
bate court shall proceed as follows:
(1) If the appraised value of the homestead . . . shall not exceed
$3,500.00, no further action shall be taken ....
(2) If the appraised value of the homestead... shall exceed $3,500.00,
and ... the premises can be divided, and that a homestead not exceeding in
value $3,500.00 can be set apart... the probate court shall order that the lat-
ter homestead be set apart for the benefit of the ... wife....
(3) If the appraised value of the homestead ... shall exceed $3,500.00,
and if... the premises cannot be so divided that a homestead not exceeding
the value of $3,500.00 can be set apart .... the probate court shall order the
whole of such premises to be sold according to law ....
88. IX The section continues:
The fiduciary shall reserve and retain from the proceeds of such sale the
sum of $3,500.00 for the benefit of the ... widow.... The sum so reserv-
ed and retained by the fiduciary shall be invested by the fiduciary with
the approval of the probate judge, either in the purchase of a new
homestead, or in proper securities for the benefit of the ... widow ....
89. Id The section continues:
The property or securities in which it shall be invested, shall remain ex-
empt from the payment of debts and the expenses of administering his
estate in like manner as a legal homestead would have remained exempt,
and shall finally go to the persons, who, upon termination of such exemp-
tion, would have been entitled to the homestead if it had not been sold.
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be considered as proceeds from the sale of that interest. The
Alabama statute was treated as such in United States v. Hiles." The
estate in Hiles deducted the commuted value of two statutory in-
terests, dower and homestead, as marital deductions.' The Internal
Revenue Service disallowed both deductions, arguing that each in-
terest was a life estate and that the cash represented proceeds from
the sale of the life interests. 2 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
decided in favor of the taxpayer on the dower issue and against the
taxpayer on the homestead issue.
As to the commutation of the dower, the court applied the
chose in action theory whereby the cash represented an assignment of
an equity right vested at the decedent's death.93 Conversely, the court
distinguished the homestead from the dower.9 ' Citing a Supreme
Court of Alabama decision9 5 the court considered the homestead prop-
erty right as vesting in the widow at the time of death." The
homestead interest, a life interest, was therefore a terminable in-
terest not subject to the marital deduction provisions, and the
amount received for the homestead interest was "in the nature of a
payment for her homestead life interest."97
Cash as proceeds from the sale of the homestead interest can
be distinguished from cash as an assignment of a vested interest.
The cash proceeds from the sale come through the property award
and do not vest from the decedent. Whereas a cash assignment is a
payment for a chose in action vested in the surviving spouse at the
decedent's death, the cash award is one equal alternative or option
to the property award. Thus, a cash award which is deemed pro-
ceeds from the sale of the homestead property interest will not
qualify as a marital deduction.
Mandatory or Discretionary Sale of the Homestead Property
Another criterion for examining a statute is whether the sale
of the homestead is required by law or allowed at the option of the
90. 318 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1963).
91. Id at 58.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 60.
94. Id.
95. Grisham v. Rotholz, 219 Ala. 434, 122 So. 649 (1929). This court satisfied
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service v. Estate of Bosch requirement of being
the highest court of the state.
96. United States v. Hiles, 318 F.2d 56, 60 (5th Cir. 1963).
97. Id
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surviving spouse. The Treasury Department has been very specific
in this area of homestead analysis. Revenue Ruling 72-153 was pro-
mulgated to specifically qualify the State of Washington cash award
as a marital deduction. 8 The Revised Code of Washington, section
11.52.101, provides:
If it is made to appear to the satisfaction of the court
that no homestead has been claimed in the manner provided
by law, either prior or subsequent to the death of the per-
son whose estate is being administered, then the court,
after hearing and upon being satisfied that the funeral ex-
penses, expenses of last sickness and of administration
have been paid or provided for, and upon petition for that
purpose, shall award and set off to the surviving spouse, if
any, property of the estate, either community or separate,
not exceeding the value of twenty thousand dollars at the
time of death .... 99
The Revenue Ruling characterized the statute as being mandatory
rather than permissive.' 0 This distinction is important because the
Supreme Court of Washington in In re Poli's Estate"1 stated the
time of vesting of a property interest granted to a surviving spouse
is dependent on whether the language of the statute is mandatory
or discretionary. Following the Poli decision, the cash award vests
immediately on the decedent's death. Accordingly, Revenue Ruling
72-153 held that the cash award "is not a nondeductible terminable
interest and therefore the value of the property awarded qualifies
for the [marital] deduction."'0' The lesson from this Revenue Ruling
is that the specific language of a statute is important in order to
claim the cash award as a marital deduction.
A later Revenue Ruling, 76-166,'0' uses the mandatory/discre-
tionary distinction in allowing a marital deduction for the Arizona
cash award. It cites Revenue Ruling 72-153 and the fact that the
Washington statute considered the interest of the spouse as vested
because of the mandatory language.0 4 However, in the discussion of
98. Rev. Rul. 72-153, 1972-1 C.B. 309.
99. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.52.010 (Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
100. Rev. Rul. 72-153, 1972-1 C.B. 309.
101. In re Poli's Estate, 27 Wash. 2d 670, 179 P.2d 704 (1947). This court
satisfies the Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service v. Estate of Bosch require-
ment of being the highest court of the state.
102. Rev. Rul. 72-153, 1972-1 C.B. 309.
103. Rev. Rul. 76-166, 1976-1 C.B. 287, 288.
104. Id.
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the Arizona statute no mention is made of any Arizona state law
that requires vesting if the language is mandatory. The Ruling
states that under the Arizona statute the spouse must elect to take
her interest and that it is a vested interest since there are no
substantial conditions or limitations on her right to ownership of the
allowance."' The Arizona law states, "A surviving spouse of a dece-
dent who was domiciled in this state is entitled to an allowance of
six thousand dollars."''0 Therefore, from the analysis of Revenue
Rulings 72-153 and 76-166, any statute providing a cash award will
qualify for the marital deduction if the language of the statute is
mandatory .17
Statutory Source of the Cash Award
Along with the other factors, the source of the cash award
must be a statute rather than an agreement between the spouse and
the estate. If the source of the cash award is a statute, then the
passing of the statutory interest would relate back to the date of
death of the decedent.' The importance of the source of the cash
award is discussed in Estate of Nachimson."' Under New Jersey
dower law, the widow had a dower interest which could be com-
muted with a lump-sum cash award."0 However, the widow by-
passed the court system which would have awarded the lump-sum,
and as a result of arm's length bargaining, the representatives of
the estate and the widow entered into an agreement as to the
amount of the lump-sum payment."' In consideration of the lump-
sum the widow released all her claims of dower."' The tax court
agreed that the state law had provisions for a lump-sum award in
lieu of the dower interest, but the court said the spouse did not use
105. Id.
106. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 14-2401 (Supp. 1978-79).
107. It should be noted that the Washington and Arizona statutes do not allow
the awarding of the homestead property, but only an allowance in lieu of the
homestead interest in the form of a cash award. Providing only an allowance provision
avoids the problem in some state statutes where the statute provides a property
award or a cash award.
108. United States v. Crosby, 257 F.2d 515, 519-20 (5th Cir. 1958) (The fair
equivalent of dower was an interest which passed from the decedent under Alabama
law and was properly included as a part of the marital deduction and was not subject
to federal estate tax).
109. 50 T.C. 452 (1968).
110. Id. at 454.
111. Id at 453.
112. 1&
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the judicial procedure for making the award."8 Therefore, the award
was not a statutory award which would have passed from the dece-
dent.11' The cash award was actually in the form of proceeds from
the sale of her dower interest."5 Applying this rationale to
homestead interests, in order for a cash award to pass from the
decedent and so be eligible for the marital deduction, the source of
the cash award must be a statute and not an agreement between the
estate and the surviving spouse.
Summary of the Cash Award in Lieu of Homestead
The cash award in lieu of the homestead interest presents a
more difficult analysis than the simple award of the homestead prop-
erty. Due to this complexity the cases and rulings regarding
homestead and the marital deduction have focused primarily on the
cash award. However, a prediction of qualification for the marital
deduction is not precluded by the entanglement of interests and
awards. The basic marital deduction requirements of passing from
the decedent to the spouse and terminability lay the foundation for
exclusion of the homestead interest in the form of a cash award. For
vesting, the analysis must go beyond that of the property award to
a level where the awarding of either the property or the cash is
an assignment or payment for an interest vested at death in the
form of a chose in action. From the cash award branch of the chose
in action, the cash must satisfy the terminable interest rule so as
not to be contingent on some later-occurring event such as reinvest-
ment or death. The chose in action theory will be of little benefit if the
cash award is obtained past the vesting requirement but is stopped
by a condition of terminability.
Notwithstanding the chose in action theory, the cash award
will not qualify for the marital deduction if the cash represents a
sale of a homestead interest. Proceeds from a sale are not con-
sidered as vested from the decedent. Additionally, the statute must
mandate a sale of the homestead to satisfy the cash award to the
surviving spouse since a discretionary sale will contravene Revenue
Rulings 72-153 and 76-166. Finally, the cash award must be derived
from a statutory source because property received by the surviving
spouse as a result of an agreement with the estate administrators
does not vest from the decedent.
113. Id. at 454.
114. Id
115. Id
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Based on the factors contributing to qualification or dis-
qualification of the marital deduction, the appendix presents an
analysis of each state's homestead exemption statute. In the appen-
dix the property award and the cash award are independently
analyzed to determine if a marital deduction is allowed in each par-
ticular state.
ANALYSIS OF HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION STATUTES
An analysis of the state homestead exemption statutes entails
a thorough search of the various state laws. In this search an initial
determination must be made as to whether the state provides a prop-
erty award and whether the state provides a cash award. Some
states have property awards but no cash award provisions. Other
statutes will grant an allowance of cash but give no interest in the
homestead property. Still other states provide both the property
award and the cash award. Some states have repealed homestead
provisions in favor of other statutory interests such as the family
allowance which grants the family an outright sum of money upon
the decedent's death. No matter which situation is found in a par-
ticular state, the factors contributing to or precluding a marital
deduction will affect the relationship between estate planning and
the homestead exemption.
In the following appendix the property award and the cash
award are treated separately for each state. The analysis of the par-
ticular state laws and court decisions relating to the property award
where the surviving spouse retains an interest in the homestead
property will include an examination of the vesting of the
homestead interest in the surviving spouse. Coterminous investiga-
tion will determine if the interest is a terminable interest such that
a marital deduction would be denied. In like manner, the cash award
must meet the vesting and terminability requirements. However, a
close look at the laws may reveal possibilities of applying the chose
in action theory to qualify the cash as a marital deduction.
Throughout the review of the statutes, the source of the cash award
is noted. Also important is whether the cash award is a discre-
tionary award which would disqualify any chance of becoming a
marital deduction and whether the cash award truly constitutes pro-
ceeds from the sale of a homestead interest which negates likelihood
of vesting from the decedent.
The language of the statute will satisfy the analytical factors.
Absent any specific criterion from a marital deduction point of view,
a study of the underlying court decisions which have interpreted the
1979]
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homestead statute will be undertaken. At all times during the ven-
ture into the court interpretations, the tenative nature of a decision
other than that of the highest court of the state will be kept in
mind. Any decision other than that of the highest court is suscepti-
ble to being overruled by a federal court.
For the property award or the cash award to qualify as a
marital deduction, the state homestead statute or its interpretation
by the courts will need to provide for passage of the interest from
the decedent to the surviving spouse in order to satisfy Code sec-
tion 2056(a). Also, to prevent exclusion of an interest which does
pass from the decedent, the interest must not be a terminable in-
terest of Code section 2056(b). The analysis reveals that a state
homestead statute which provides a homestead exemption may also
provide the estate and the surviving spouse with a marital deduc-
tion which will decrease the estate tax burden, the ultimate goal of
estate planning.
CONCLUSION
The homestead exemption is one statutory interest passing to
the surviving spouse which can be used to reduce the federal estate
tax burden. The reduction in taxes will take place if the exemption
qualifies as a marital deduction under Code section 2056(a). Not only
must the exemption fulfill the requirements of section 2056(a), it
must not be a terminable interest as described by section 2056(b).
The individual state homestead statutes can be analyzed as an
award of the homestead property or as a cash award in lieu of the
homestead interest. Many of the property award statutes are ex-
cluded from a possible marital deduction by application of the ter-
minable interest rule. As indicated in the appendix, South Dakota,
Utah, California and Nevada are the only states in which an exclu-
sion of a homestead property award may possibly be attempted.
Aside from terminability, the greater problem with cash
awards is meeting the vesting requirements of section 2056(a). Using
the various tools of analysis developed, the possible states qualify-
ing a cash award for a marital deduction are Alaska, Arizona,
California, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, Ohio, Utah and Washington. Washington and
Arizona are specifically allowed by the respective Revenue Rulings
72-153 and 76-166.
Although the amount of the homestead exemption may be
minor in comparison to other estate distributions, effective estate ad-
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ministration requires taking every legitimate deduction in order to
protect the estate assets. The homestead exemption as a marital
deduction is one way to protect these assets from federal estate tax-
ation.
Louis D. Fisher
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